sentiments, then a decline in the mortality rate is likely to increase a sense of personal efficacy, strengthen the secular approach, and lead people to become more future-oriented. In short, a change in mortality rates could affect what many political scientists have called the political culture. Students of political socialization would thus be well advised to examine the relationship between declining mortality rates and changes in the political culture.* 8. As Ryder has pointed out, a period of rapid population growth is one in which the relationship of children to adults and of women to men undergoes great changes (80). Modernizing states have affected these relationships through a range of public policies: compulsory education which removes the child from the home, child labor legislation which effectively increases the costs to parents of having children, inheritance legislation which fragments the family property and protects the wife and younger children, age-of-marriage legislation which delays childbearing, and legislation prohibiting discrimination in the employment of women which increases the number of women in the labor force. Although the primary purposes of most of this legislation were to improve the well-being of children and of women or to facilitate economic growth, clearly such legislation also has an impact on family-size norms. If, as some economists and sociologists argue, the costs and benefits of children, the education of women, and the employment opportunities available for women influence the reproductive decisions of couples, then political movements emphasizing equal rights for women and the care and protection of children could have a considerable impact on population growth.' 9. The political effects of high density are at least as unclear as the mental and physical health consequences and are closely related to them. Does high density—at work, at home, or in transportation—increase social conflict and generate aggressive behavior? As human conglomerations increase, can we expect a decline in civic behavior? An increase in anomic behavior? Or alternatively, new forms of social control and new modes of social and political organization? How do social groups feel when their numbers are increasing and they are confined to a fixed territory while others in the larger society can readily move about? Do black ghetto dwellers feel they are denied the opportunities *Riesman (79) has made a provocative but nonetheless unsuccessful attempt to link demographic change to personality structure. He related his three personality types— "tradition-directed," "inner-directed," and "other-directed" personalities-to three demographic phases: "high growth potential" when birth and death rates are high, "transitional growth" when the death rate declines but the birth rate has not, and "incipient population decline" when total population growth is small because both birth and death rates are low. The theory, never very well formulated in any event, was not applied in any systematic way to cross-cultural or historical data. tpor an account of the impact of demographic change on the rise of legislationhe literature on the political behavior of urban migrants, see (62).